Physicalism - sometimes referred to as materialism - is a philosophical perspective that asserts that everything in existence is ultimately physical by nature. Thus everything that exists can ultimately be reduced to physical entities or processes and can be explained in those terms. As such, this view denies the existence of anything non-physical or supernatural. It follows that only physical things can be studied and understood within the framework of the natural sciences. Also implied is that all phenomena - including mental states and consciousness - can be understood purely in physical terms. (Remembering that biochemistry can be reduced to physics.)
As a worldview, physicalism emerged in response to the problems arising from dualism. Dualism proposes the existence of two fundamentally distinct substances: the physical and the non-physical. The latter is often associated with the mind or soul. (Substance being used here in a philosophical rather than scientific sense.) Physicalism takes its fundamental stance from denying that the mind or soul exists apart from a body with live physical processes.
Physicalism has difficulties of its own. One of the key debates within physicalism concerns the nature of mind and consciousness. Critics of physicalism often raise doubts about its ability to account fully for phenomena like consciousness and subjective experience. Within physicalism, there are shades of opinion in response. Some physicalists argue that consciousness can be explained fully by neurobiological processes in the brain. Others treat mental phenomena as something distinct proposing a separate approach - albeit within the tenets of physicalism.
Biological science avoids these problems by either being unaware of them or actively ignoring them. However, it would be beneficial for biologists to be aware of the thought around physicalism. Biology is an essentially materialistic science.
The biologist and the things biologists study belong to the same realm: that of living things. However, the two are kept very separate. The biological characteristics of the biologist are never allowed to inform the object of study - or vice versa.
This is typically explained as keeping subjective experience out of objective observation. But has anybody tried to find a middle ground? Has anybody tried to develop a way of embracing the subjective to the benefit of the objective? I am unaware of any concerted attempts to do so. If there are any, I am sure they will have been kept to the periphery of biological science as it is typically practised.